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Abstract - Digital objects are managed in a controlled way through the complete value chain by DRM systems.
Access Control Frameworks manage access by users to resources. This paper presents a solution that enables
users of both systems to work collaboratively. It is based on the definition of an interoperability Broker that
provides users of both systems with transparent access and use of content taking into account users’ roles and
content usage rules. It consists of modules that provide interoperability between digital rights and access control
rules, between protected  digital objects and digital resources and to manage the user’s roles in both systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a solution for Digital Rights
Management (DRM) and Access Control
Frameworks (ACF) interoperability. Firstly, the
DRM and ACF architectures developed by the
authors are presented. The DRM architecture
enables the management of multimedia information
in a controlled way through the complete digital
value chain taking into account DRM and
protection. The ACF manages access by users to
resources (e.g. applications or data). Secondly, a
solution is proposed that enables users of both
systems to use digital content in a controlled way.
This solution is based on a ‘Broker’ that provides
interoperability between DRM and ACF access
control rules, between digital objects and digital
media and between protection information
associated to digital resources of both systems.
Moreover, the Broker manages the users’ roles in
both systems. Finally, a virtual collaboration
scenario is presented to illustrate the two
architectures interoperating.
2. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
INITIATIVES
The digital object creation process combines the
protected digital assets with their related metadata.
These objects can be governed by licenses
expressed according to a Rights Expression
Language (REL) and protected by means of
different protection techniques, such as encryption
(the most used). The governed digital objects are
distributed to the different actors of the value chain.
Finally, DRM players consume digital objects
according to the terms and conditions specified in
the associated licenses. Some participants of the
distribution chain, as content creators or
distributors, may want to monitor usage of their
copyrighted material. Hence, DRM systems support
the sharing of information about events related to
content and peers that interact with the content.
Nowadays, there are several initiatives that specify
a DRM system or the set of elements that make up
a DRM system. Among the most relevant initiatives
in the area we can find the MPEG-21 standard[1],
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) DRM[2], Windows
Media DRM[3] and Apple Fairplay[4].
3. DRM ARCHITECTURE
This section presents the DMAG-MIPAMS
architecture[5][6], sketched in Fig. 1, that we have
developed to manage multimedia information
taking into account DRM and protection.
This architecture aims to enable the management of
multimedia content through the complete content
value chain, from content creation to consumption
by end users, including adaptation and distribution
of content. DMAG-MIPAMS is a service-oriented
DRM platform and all its modules have been
devised to be implemented using the web services
approach, which provides flexibility and enables an
easy deployment of the modules in a distributed
environment, while keeping the functionality
independent from the programming language and
enabling interoperability. Next sections present the
functionality of each of the defined modules.
3.1. Content Server
The Content Server enables users to browse/select
content, provides the content that the users request
to user applications, and adds metadata to received
raw content from providers and registers and stores
the created digital objects.
3.2. Supervision Server
The Supervision Server authenticates and
supervises actors and system components and
manages event reports about content consumption.
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3.3. Governance Server
The Governance Server provides functionality for
the creation and storage of licenses, online license-
based authorisation and translation of licenses
between different rights expression languages.
3.4. Protection Server
The Protection Server provides functionality for the
protection of digital objects and for the generation,
storage and delivery of protection keys and
protection information.
3.5. Trusted Client
The Trusted Client module provides functionality
for the creation and editing of digital objects, and
for retrieving event reports, rights expressions, and
protection and processing information.
4. ACCESS CONTROL FRAMEWORKS
ACFs manage access by users to resources (e.g.
applications or data) for multiple systems or
networks. They are particularly useful for Virtual
Organisations (VOs), which are an ad-hoc
integration of resources across organisational
boundaries to support collaborative working.
Characteristics of VOs include:
• Resources are owned by multiple
organisations with multiple policies.
• Policies may need to be set up on demand,
and may change over time at short notice.
• No common administrative point, security
architecture or security mechanisms exist
across the VO (one technical solution
cannot be enforced).
Typically, access control is managed separately for
individual systems. However, for VOs this can be
impractical, both from an administrator's and end
user’s point of view (e.g. having to remember many
passwords). ACFs deal with this problem by
providing a simplified and consistent approach.
Examples include Kerberos[7], Liberty Alliance[8]
and WS-Federation (Web Services-Federation)[9].
Some are aimed at multiple scenarios, but many are
tailored to particular requirements. E.g., in grid
computing the requirement is, typically, to involve
administrators as little as possible by delegating
management to users. However, other scenarios
may require more centralised control.
A common feature of ACFs is the use of "tokens"
(e.g. attribute and authorisation certificates[10]
[11], or generic policy tokens such as KeyNote[12]
or Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML)[13]). Tokens provide users with the means
to prove they have the rights to perform a certain
action, without the need for direct involvement of
central administrators. Most ACFs use only one
token format, however, some use gateways to
convert between different formats. These gateways
handle the heterogeneity in formats and
mechanisms that can exist amongst the
organisations involved in a VO. WS-Federation[9]
is a notable example that makes use of this concept.
5. ACCESS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
We have developed an ACF (illustrated in Fig. 1)
designed for VOs and multimedia data (note that
this architecture is patent pending). We assume that
data may be highly sensitive, leading to significant
constraints on its use and an ACF that differs from
previous work (albeit based on WS-Federation[9]
to some extent). Similarly to the DRM architecture,
the components have been designed using a WS
approach, where "Servers" are WSs and "Agents"
are WS clients. A prototype implementation has
been produced using WS and SAML tokens. Each
component is briefly described in the following
subsections.
5.1. User and Service Agents
These agents intercept requests from users to access
services, and ensure that authorisation is in place by
communicating with the Servers to obtain and
provide authorisation tokens to Service Agents.
5.2. Network Access Server
This server accepts authenticated requests to access
its network and, if acceptable, returns an
authorisation token in return. It acts as a token
gateway by accepting requests from users in other
networks using those networks’ formats, and
returning a token in its own network’s format.
5.3. Application/Data Access Server
This server accepts Network Access Server tokens
together with a request to access an application or
data item. If acceptable, it returns a token in return,
which can then be provided to the Service Agent.
5.4. Auditing Server
This server keeps a record of all access to services
by users for auditing purposes, and to allow rapid
revocation (see below).
5.5. Enforcement Server
This server uses information from the Auditing
Server to immediately revoke access to services
that a user is no longer permitted to access.
6. INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN DRM
AND ACCESS CONTROL ARCHITECTURES
Digital objects are managed in a controlled way by
both DRM systems and ACFs. This section
presents a solution (illustrated in Fig. 1) that
enables users of both to work collaboratively.
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Fig. 1. DRM AC Broker
It is based on an interoperability Broker that
provides users of both systems with transparent
access and use of content taking into account users’
roles and content usage rules.
The Broker consists of modules that provide
interoperability between digital rights and access
control rules, between digital objects and digital
media and between protection information.
Moreover, the Broker manages users’ roles in both
systems.
The modules of the Broker are detailed below.
6.1. Digital Media Formats Converter
In the DRM architecture, content is packaged and
delivered to users within Digital Objects, defined
according to the MPEG-21 Digital Item Declaration
Language[14]. In the ACF, the content is
distributed encrypted to the users of the system,
without being packaged in any digital object. The
Broker provides functionality to enable interchange
of content and digital objects between the systems.
6.2. Digital Rights and Policies Interpreter
In the DRM architecture, licenses govern the
content. A license grants to a user or group of users
the sanction to exercise a right against a resource if
a set of conditions have been previously fulfilled. In
the ACF, access to content depends on defined
access control policies that authorise a group of
users (depending on their roles) to perform a set of
actions over a set of resources. The Broker enables
interoperability between licenses and access control
policies through the generation of licenses and
policies to govern content in both systems and by
interpreting them to perform authorisation decisions
for operations requested by users of both systems.
6.3. Protection Information Manager
In the DRM architecture, Digital Items are
protected and information regarding the protection
tools used is associated to the items. A Digital Item
can be protected at any level of granularity, from a
complete Digital Item to a specific digital resource.
In the ACF, digital resources are protected as a
whole using a pre-defiend algorithm. The Broker
manages protection information and the protected
content in both systems.
6.4. Roles Manager
The Roles Manager module manages the roles of
users of the DRM and ACF architectures. In both,
authentication of users involves the identification of
users and assignment of roles to them. The Broker
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validates provided tokens and translates the user’s
roles (contained in the tokens) between the systems.
7. APPLICATION SCENARIO
We present a VO scenario to illustrate the two
architectures interoperating. In the scenario, several
organisations, including ‘Aa’ and ‘Bb’, have set up
a VO using the combined architectures to allow
them to work together on a project to design and
produce a new ‘widget’. This VO includes a shared
repository (situated on Aa’s network) that stores
protected data which is downloadable by anybody,
but can only be used according to the associated
licences. Example use cases are given below for the
widget design phase. Similar controls can be
enforced for review and production phases (not
shown here due to space constraints).
Use Case: Alice (an authorised Aa Designer)
edits the design document.
• Alice authenticates herself to the Network
Access Server on Aa and requests to activate
her Designer role. The Server verifies she is
allowed to, and returns a token for this role.
• Alice authenticates herself as a Designer to the
Data Access Server on Aa using this token, and
requests access to the design document. This
Server asks the Governance Server to retrieve
the relevant licences and check that access is
allowed. It then requests a decryption key from
the Protection Server and returns it to Alice.
• Alice decrypts the document and edits it.
Use Case: Alice stores the design document
• Alice contacts the Protection Server to apply
protection to the updated document.
• Alice contacts the Governance Server to create
the licenses for this document. Licences for
Designers and Project Managers are created
and stored by the Governance Server, to restrict
access to these roles only.
• Alice formats the protected data into a new
Digital Item using the Content Server, and
stores it back on the shared data repository.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a solution for enabling Digital
Rights Management (DRM) and Access Control
architectures interoperate. The presented solution is
based on the definition of a Broker designed to
manage the user’s roles in both systems and to
facilitate interoperability between digital rights
governing digital objects in the DRM architecture
and access control rules in the Access Control
Framework. The Broker also will manage protected
digital objects and digital resources for both
architectures. Finally, in order to illustrate how both
architectures interoperate a virtual collaboration
scenario is presented. In this scenario several
organisations have set up a VO to allow users of
both systems to work together on a project to
design and produce a new widget.
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